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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 201000310-CA

vs.
WILLIAM ALFRED DICK,
Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
This Court has appellate-review jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4103(2)(e) (2009).
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court erred in denying Defendant's Motion for a New Trial when

the State failed to provide Brady Evidence to the defense. A trial court's decision to grant
or deny a motion for a new trial is reviewed for a clear abuse of discretion. State v.
Eisner, 2001 UT 99,1J31, 37 P.3d 1073. "At the same time, however", the court will
"review the legal standards applied by the trial court in denying such a motion for
correctness." State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, % 28, 979 P.2d 799. This issue was
preserved in arguments to the trial court and after that court issued its ruling denying the
defendant's motion by the defense filing of this appeal. (R. 1000)
2.

Whether the trial court erred in allowing Miguel Mendez to testify when the State

had provided no notice to the defense of his existence, testimony, or relevant contact

1
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information. The decision by a trial court whether to bar testimony by a witness because
a party failed to comply with discovery obligations is reviewed under an abuse of
discretion standard. State v. Perez, 2002 UT App 211 % 24, 52 P.3d 4 5 1 . This issue was
preserved in arguments made at trial objecting to the witness being called. (R. 1012; 7882)

CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 16: Discovery
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall disclose to the defense upon
request the following material or information of which he has knowledge:
(1) relevant written or recorded statements of the defendant or
codefendants;
(2) the criminal record of the defendant;
(3) physical evidence seized from the defendant or codefendant;
(4) evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the
accused, mitigate the guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the degree of the
offense for reduced punishment; and
(5) any other item of evidence which the court determines on good cause
shown should be made available to the defendant in order for the defendant
to adequately prepare his defense.
(b) The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as soon as practicable following the
filing of charges and before the defendant is required to plead. The prosecutor has
a continuing duty to make disclosure.
(g)If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the attention
of the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule, the court may order
such party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a continuance, or prohibit
the party from introducing evidence not disclosed, or it may enter such other order
as it deems just under the circumstances.

i

I
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I

STATEMENT OF THE CASES
Nature of the Case
William Dick appeals from a jury's conviction of first, Possession with Intent to
Distribute a Controlled Substance, a first degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§58-37-8(l)(A)(IH); second* Illegal Possession or Use of a Controlled Substance, a
second degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8(2AI); third, Illegal
Possession or Use of a Controlled Substance, a second degree felony in violation of Utah
Code Ann. §58-37-8(2AI); fourth, Illegal Possession or Use of a Controlled Substance, a
class A misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8(2AI); fifth, Possession of
Drug Paraphernalia, a class B Misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-37A5(1); sixth, Unlawful Possession of a Dangerous Weapon, a class A misdemeanor in
violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-10-503(3)(B), and seventh, Lewdness, a class B
misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-9-702(1) before the honorable A. Lynn
Payne in the Eighth District Court.

Trial Court Proceeding and Disposition of the Case
The State charged the defendant by information February 14, 2008. (R. 1). The
defendant was charged with first, Possession with Intent to Distribute a Controlled
Substance, a first degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8(l)(A)(III);
second, Illegal Possession or Use of a Controlled Substance, a second degree felony in

3
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violation of Utah Code Ann. §5 8-37-8(2AI); third, Illegal Possession or Use of a
Controlled Substance, a second degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-378(2AI); fourth, Illegal Possession or Use of a Controlled Substance, a class A
misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8(2AI); fifth, Possession of Drug
Paraphernalia, a class B Misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-37A-5(l);
sixth, Unlawful Possession of a Dangerous Weapon, a class A misdemeanor in violation
of Utah Code Ann. §76-10-503(3)(B), and seventh, Lewdness, a class B misdemeanor in
violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-9-702(1). (R. 1-3). Additionally, William Dick was
charged with Labeling and Packaging a Controlled Substance, a class B misdemeanor in
violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-37-7, and Theft by Receiving Stolen Property, a class B
misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-408.
On April 2, 2008, the defendant waived his Preliminary Hearing and entered a not
guilty plea on all counts. (R. 39). William Dick's case originally went to trial on January
2 9 , 2 0 1 0 . (R. 267-69). After the jury, was sworn defense counsel moved for a mistrial,
which the court granted. William's jury trial was rescheduled for March 26-27, 2009 and
took place on those days. (R. 342-46). Prior to beginning the trial, the State moved to
<
dismiss two counts. After William had testified, the State -called a rebuttal witness,
Miguel M e n d e z ( R . 1012: 83-122).
Prior to calling Mr. Mendez, the state had provided no information in regards to
his existence and what he would be testifying too. Defense counsel objected to Mr.

4
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Mendez being called as a witness as it constituted surprise and ambush by the State. (R
1012: 78-82). The State alleged that because Mr. Mendez was being called as a rebuttal
witness to William Dick's testimony, no notice to defense was required. (R 1012: 79-80).
Additionally, counsel for the State alleged that Mr. Mendez had received no deal in
exchange for his testimony. (R. 1012: 78-82) The court ruled in favor of the state
allowing Mr. Mendez to testify. (R.1012: 81). Defense counsel cross-examined Mr.
Mendez as well as possible considering they possessed no information about Mr. Mendez.
William was found guilty of all charges. (R. 1012: 243-44). William was
sentenced on May 27, 2009 to an indeterminate term of five years to life in the Utah State
Prison. (R. 453-55). At sentencing, defense counsel asked for a continuance based on
new evidence found regarding the testimony of Miguel Mendez. However, prior to
sentencing defense counsel filed a motion to compel discovery on May 15, 2009. (R.
450-51). Defense counsel filed a notice of intent to appeal on appeal on June 4, 2009. (R.
461-63).
The trial court granted William's motion to compel discovery on June 11, 2009.
(R. 483-84). Based on the new evidence discovered, the defense filed a Motion for a
New Trial on June 11, 2009 and amended the motion on June 18, 2009. (R. 485-513,
518-554). Due to the slow nature in which the evidence sought was produced, defense
counsel sought multiple motions to compel the production of evidence. (R. 450-51,55657,693-96,834-836).

5
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The trial court heard oral arguments on the defense's motion for a new trial on
March 3, 2010. (R. 1010). Defense counsel provided supplementation to the testimony
taken at oral argument (R. 971-76). The trail court issued its ruling denying the defense
motion for a new trial on March 3 1 , 2010. (R. 977-99). The defendant filed his notice of
appeal on April 6, 2010. (R. 1000)

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On February 10, 2008, the defendant, William Dick's, jeep had broken down. (R.
1012: 6-7). He had borrowed a car from a friend to use running errands in hopes of
obtaining the parts necessary to repair his jeep. (R. 1012:8). When William picked up
the car he noticed that it had a lot of clutter and personal items strewn about in both the
front and rear passenger areas. (R.1012: 10-11). William drove to multiple places
searching for the needed parts, lastly going to his family's shed to pick up tools he would
need to make the repairs. (R. 1012: 12).
As William was traveling back home he began to encounter snow on parts of the
dirt and gravel road on which he was traveling. ( R. 1012: 12-16). He believed, albeit
mistakenly, that he would be able to drive through the snow. One portion of the snow he
encountered was too deep and slick and the car lost momentum becoming stuck in several
inches of snow. (R. 1012: 16). As the cold and darkness of the winter night set further in,
William had to assess his situation. (R. 1012" 16-17). William did not have a coat or

6
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warm gear and the weather was extremely cold. He was too far removed from a paved
road that walking away from the vehicle was not an option. (R. 1012: 17-18). William
did not know if the gasoline in the car would last through the night, and decided his best
option was to attempt to dig his way out. (R. 1012: 17-18).
As he searched the passenger compartment for something to use as a digging tool,
he discovered a large buck knife. (R. 1012: 19-20) There being nothing else of remote
use, William began the slow and painstaking process of digging out the car. (R. 1012:
21). Over a period of several hours, William would dig out the car and be able to move it
a short distance down the road and repeat the process. (R. 1012: 21-22). During this
process, William grew cold and wet from being on his knees in the snow for extended
periods of time. (R. 1012: 21-23). At about 4:00 AM William was able to get the car
back onto a paved road. (R. 1012: 22).
Shivering and delirious, William made his way to a care center where his best
friend lived. (R. 1012: 24). William pulled into the front area of the care center and
rolled down his window calling for help, but no one came. (R. 1012: 25-26). Knowing
that he need to remove his soaked clothing and get warm, William took off his wet and
frozen shoes, socks, pants and underpants. (R. 1012: 26-27). He put his feet up on the
dash so they would be near the only place that heat was emanating. (R. 1012: 27).
William fell asleep with the car running and the side window partially down. (R. 1012:
28)

7
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On the morning of February 11, 2009, a woman observes William's vehicle in the
parking lot of the care center and sees a partially naked man sleeping in the driver seat.
(R. 1007: 173). She calls the police to report her observations. (R 1007: 174). Officer's
arrive on scene and knock on the window in an attempt to wake William. (R. 1012: 28).
Unsuccessful in his attempt to wake the driver (William) by knocking, the officer opens
the driver door and physically shakes William awake. (R.1007; 191).
The officers remove William from the vehicle, but he has great difficulty standing
up and following the officer's directions, (R. 1007: 193). Officers conduct a background
check and find William to be a restricted person and arrest him when they see the buck
knife previously used to dig out the car in plain view on the seat. (R. 1007: 200). The
officers arrest William and begin searching his vehicle locating no contraband. (R. 1007:
199-200). Later, officers call for a K-9 to inspect the vehicle. (R.1007: 199). The
officers run the dog in and out of the car between the front seat and back seat. (R. 1007:
228-29). The dog traipsed through the vehicle for at lea&t 15 minutes. (R. 1007: 229).
The K-9 hits on the front area around the air vents and in the rear passenger foot
compartment behind the driver seat. (R. 1007: 199).
Under the driver seat of the car, officers discover methamphetamine wrapped in a
bandanna with an approximate street value of $1,500.00. (R. 1007: 209). Officers claim
that at the jail during a recorded confession that William admitted the drugs were his. (R.
1012: 128). However, the officer who records the confession claims that his recorder

8
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malfunctioned so he cannot play the recorded confession. (R. 1012: 128-29). William
denied ever buying, possessing, or knowing about the drugs that were found in the car.
(R. 1012:36-37).
In response to William's testimony, the State called Miguel Mendez as a rebuttal
witness. (R. 1012: 78-122) At the time he was called, the state had not even produced
Miguel's name to defense counsel. (R. 1012: 78-80). Outside the presence of the jury,
the prosecution proffered that Mendez would testify that around February of 2008, he
witnessed William purchase $1,500 worth of meth from his friend on consignment. (R.
1012: 82-107). It was farther proffered that Mendez would testify that he was not offered
anything in exchange for his testimony against William, but that he was simply trying to
do the right thing. (R. 1012: 78-122). Prosecutor Joann Stringham added her assurance
that Mendez was offered nothing by the state for his testimony against William. (R.
1012:80-82).
The defense made an "ambush" objection to the proffered testimony of Mendez
since this was the first the defense had heard any mention of Mendez by law enforcement
or prosecution despite discovery requests having been made. (R. 1012: 79) The only
reference to Mendez prior to this was the prosecution threatening with 2 un-named
rebuttal witnesses from the jail. (R.1012: 81). The trial judge overruled the defense
objection and Mendez offered testimony consistent with what had been proffered. (R.
1012:82-122).

9
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Under the Utah and Federal Constitutions, criminal defendants are entitled to due
process of law, in that their right to a fair trial is inviolable. Here, Defendant asserts that
the State's actions at trial, but also throughout the proceedings, fundamentally impaired
his right to a fair trial and the trial court erred by abusing its discretion in not granting
Defendant's Motion for New Trial and allowing Miguel Mendez to testify when no
discovery had been provided prior to trial.
The defendant made a Motion for a New Trial alleging the State failed to provide
Brady evidence. The state kept the name of a witness, Miguel Mendez from the defense
up until the second day of trial when he was called as a rebuttal witness. Mendez'
testimony proved crucial to placing the exact amount of drugs found in the car in the
defendant's possession. Mendez had met with detectives and agreed to provide
information and testify against the defendant in order to get a plea deal that would assure
him a swift return to his family in Mexico. The testimony was key in the trial, and the
defense was denied the opportunity to impeach Mendez as all discovery related to him
was not provided until nearly 9 months after trial. The State's actions constitute a
violation of the Brady rule and it's three prong test.
In the second issue, the court erred in allowing Miguel Mendez to testify. The
state is under a continuing burden to provide inculpatory evidence to the defense.

10
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Mendez' testimony which place the drugs in the defendant's possession is obviously
inculpatory. As no discovery was provided about Mendez, even his name at a minimum,
the court abused it's discretion by allowing Mendez to testify over the defense objection

ARGUMENT
I.

By failing to grant a motion for a new trial after the prosecution failed to
disclose Brady evidence, the trial court abused its discretion.
Defendant asserts the trial court abused its discretion by not granting Defendant's

Motion for New Trial, which was based on the State's failure to disclose Brady evidence.
Accordingly, Defendant will show that the standard of review, which is high in that it
requires an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, is satisfied here. State v.
Bisner, 2001 UT 99,1(31, 37 P.3d 1073.
The Utah Supreme Court has affirmed that under the Utah and Federal
Constitutions, "the prosecution has a fundamental duty to disclose material, exculpatory
evidence to the defense in criminal cases." State v. Bisner, 2001 UT 99, ^[32,
37 P.3d 1073 (internal quotations omitted). And that this duty to disclose "applies both
to substantive exculpatory evidence and to that which may be used for

impeachment"

Bisner, 2001 UT 99, If 32 (emphasis added); see also, Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83
S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963).
In Brady, the United States Supreme court cites three elements, stating that if those

11
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elements combine to prejudice a defendant a trial the defendant's right to Due Process has
been violated by the prosecution as a matter of law. The elements which must combine to
prejudice a defendant at trial cited in Brady and reiterated by later courts include: first, the
evidence must have been withheld by the Prosecution, either willfully or inadvertently;
second, the evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is
exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; and third, the evidence must be material to the
outcome of the trial. See Brady generally; Mendez v. Artuz, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8841,
18; Strickler v. Greene, 119 S. Ct (1948); Moore v. Illinois 408 U.S. 786, 794-95 (1972).
William asserts that each element Brady has been met, and we take each in turn.
A.

The State withheld any and all discovery on Mendez
This element will also be discussed below further in Issue II, and will demonstrate

the State knew of Mendez' existence, likely testimony, and pertinent information.
However, the State failed to disclose Mendez.
In United States v. McVeigh, that court held that "information should be given to
the defense as it becomes known to the government since the information and material
must be available to the defense in sufficient time to make fair use of it. United States v.
McVeigh,

954 F. Supp 1441, 1440 (1997). In this case, the prosecution did not provide

even the name of Mendez until the second day of trial.
The State's attorney, Joann Stringham specifically told the court that she did not
want to disclose the names of her rebuttal witnesses, including Mendez until she

12
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absolutely had to. (R. 1012: 80). The defense fought for months after William was
convicted at trial to even obtain the Mendez discovery. Motions to compel discovery
were filed May 15, 2009, June 23, 2009, December 14, 2009, and January 20,2010. (R.
450-51,556-57, 693-96, 834-836). The state continually fought against providing the
requested discovery with motions in opposition June 11,2009, July 2, 2009, December
24, 2009, and January 22, 2010. (R. 467-85, 658-64, 698-99, 837-41).
The State had the information on Mendez for well over a year and it took multiple
requests to obtain the Mendez discovery. While the State did not provide the name or any
other information on Mendez, the true extent of the Mendez discovery was not uncovered
until nearly 2010. At that point the State finally produced tapes of interviews between
Vernal Police and Miguel Mendez for in camera review by the court. (R. 686-92). Those
tapes recorded prior to trial revealed that officers wanted Mendez to help them with
information to convict William and would get him a deal. (R. 875-901).
The State admittedly knew about Mendez and about the tapes and did not produce
them prior to William's trial on March 26-27, 2009. Whether willfully or inadvertently
the State knew of the existence of Mendez along with the substance of his testimony and
did not disclose any information. Those actions meet the first prong of the Brady
violation analysis.
B.

The Mendez discovery would have been favorable to the Defendant as it
would have provided impeachment evidence of Mendez.

13
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Because Mendez was not revealed to the defense until minutes before his
testimony, the defense was denied the opportunity to prepare for the witness and have
proper impeachment evidence. Mendez testified that he was present when a friend sold
William $1,500.00 worth of methamphetamine on consignment. (R. 1012: S5-&6). That
testimony bolstered the testimony previously given that $1,500.00 worth of
methamphetamine was found in the car William had been driving.
As stated above, police interviewed Mendez at the jail and told him that William
was a danger to the community and they wanted to put him away. (R. 898). The officers
told Mendez that the county attorney was willing to help him if he'd help her. (R. 893).
Officers also told Mendez to keep his helping with testimony against William a secret,
and said they didn't want anyone knowing what they were doing. (R. 882). Mendez told
detectives that he wanted to help because his priority is to get back with his family. (R.
893). The officers told Mendez that there were other charges that are out there that they
haven't charged him with but that they need his help because they want William taken off
the street. (R. 884-85).
The officers then went to the county attorney, Joann Stringham and asked her not
to file charges for distribution until after he was deported. (R. 867-68). This information
would have been used to impeach Mendez when he said he had not received a deal.
Additionally, had Mendez not testified as anticipated, the State could have easily filed the
distribution charges prior to his being deported by ICE. There was an incentive there for

14
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Mendez to testify against William, so as to avoid serving months or years of addition
confinement and prolonging his reunion with his family.
Had Mendez and these police interviews been disclosed, the defense would have
been able to show that contrary to his testimony on the stand he believed he was obtaining
beneficial treatment just as he had discussed with detectives Vance Norton and Andy
Meinrod. Also, the defense would have been able to cross Mendez on the fact that there
were other charges that could have been filed against him and if Mendez helped he
wouldn't fact those charges. The defense was denied this favorable impeachment
evidence because the police interview tapes were not turned over to the defense until 8
months after the trial.
Furthermore, the Mendez discovery would have led to an additional witness to
impeach Mendez. After William was sentenced, defense counsel was sent a letter by
Blake Horton. (R. 904-05). Horton had been with Mendez in jail. (R. 904-05). Mendez
had told Horton of his meeting with the police and that the police and county attorney
wanted his help in convicting William. (R. 904-05). Horton alleged that Mendez told
him that he would say whatever he needed to in order to get back to his family as quickly
as possible. (R. 904-05)
If the State had provided Mendez' name a few months before trial, defense counsel
would have had the opportunity to send out an investigator and talk to Mendez. It is
likely that Horton would have been located at that point. All of the statements made by

15
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Mendez to the police would have been available on cross examination and would have
given the defense opportunity to impeach Mendez' credibility.
As the Mendez discovery would have been favorable to the defense by creating
opportunities to impeach Mendez the second prong of the Brady analysis has been met.
C.

The non-disclosure of the Mendez discovery was material in that it
undermined the defense preparation for cross examination and impeachment
of Mendez.
If the prosecution had provided the Mendez discovery, the defense would have

been able to have a far more effective cross examination and been able to impeach
Mendez with the tapes of his statements and the testimony of Blake Horton. The
defense's inability to use that information undermines the outcome of trial. The third test
in the Brady analysis is to determine if the evidence was material to the outcome of the
trial.
Evidence is constitutionally material "if there is a reasonable probability" that the
"result of the proceeding would have been different had the evidence been disclosed to
the defense." United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 87 L. Ed. 2d 4 8 1 , 105 S. Ct.
3375(1985). InKylesv.

Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,434, 131 L. Ed. 2d 490, 115 S. Ct. 1555

(1995) (emphasis added), the United States Supreme Court stated:
Bagley *s touchstone of materiality is a "reasonable pro bability" of &
different result, and the adjective is important. The question is not whether
the defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict
with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial,
16
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understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.

'

The Bakalov court stated that "the test, therefore, is not whether the defendant
would have been acquitted had the evidence been disclosed, but whether the prosecutor's
suppression "undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial." State v.Bakalov, 1999
UT 45, P30-31; 979 P.2d 799 (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. at 434) (internal
quotations omitted).
The defense was denied any fair opportunity to impeach Mendez. Lead counsel
for the defense, Dean Zabriskie, told the trial judge at the Motion for New Trial hearing,
that if the defense would have had the Mendez discovery he'd have peeled Mendez like a
banana. (R. 1010: 9). The strength of Mendez' testimony was that the same amount of
drugs found in the car William was driving squarely in William's hands. Without that
connection it would have been just as likely that the Williams DNA on the bandana was
transferred there by the drug dog running in and out of the vehicle.
The opportunity to impeach Mendez' credibility was crucial. The defense could
have called Horton to testify that Mendez' motive for saying William bought the drugs
was to secure a deal that would get him to his family as fast as possible. These avenues
could have been exploited and were not because of the suppression of Mendez.
This prosecutorial suppression absolutely undermines the confidence in the trial.
There is a reasonable probability that the result would have been different. The trial
court, in denying the motion for a new trial, stated that the evidence would not have
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affected the outcome. (R. 979). The Brady test is not whether the evidence would have
absolutely changed the outcome, but the reasonable probability that in the absence of the
evidence the defendant did not receive a fair trial. The outcome of William's trial is not
certain, but it is certain that key testimony by a state witness could have been impeached.
That testimony wasn't because there is no way the defense could have known about the
tapes and statements made by Mendez when only being informed of his existence mere
minutes before he offered testimony. These facts call into question the outcome of the
trial and demonstrate that the defendant did not receive a fair trial.
The evidence suppressed by the state was material to the outcome. The nondisclosure of that evidence led to William being denied a fair trial. Thus, the third prong
of the Brady test is satisfied.
As it has been demonstrated that all prongs of the Brady analysis have been met,
the remedy for the Brady violation is to vacate the conviction and remand this case for a
new trial in the district court.
II.

The trial court abused its discretion by allowing Miguel Mendez to testify
when the prosecution had provided no notice whatsoever concerning him.
Over the objection of William's defense counsel, the prosecution was allowed to

present rebuttal testimony from Miguel Mendez. (R. 1012: 82). The State proffered that
Mendez' testimony would be that he witnessed Wilham take $1,500.00 dollars worth of
drugs, specifically Methamphetamine, on consignment a short time prior to when he was
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arrested outside the care center. (R. 1012: 85-86). The State ostensibly intimated that
the testimony was to be used to rebut the testimony offered by William that he was not
using Methamphetamine at that time. (R. 1012: 78). The prosecution had not mentioned
the name of Miguel Mendez until he was called as a rebuttal witness on the second day of
the jury trial. (R. 1012: 79).
The court abused its discretion by allowing Mendez to testify. The State was
under a duty to disclose all inculpatory evidence that it acquires. The failure to provide
the requested information constitutes a basis for which a new trail should be granted.
Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure governs discovery generally in
criminal trials. Rule 16 creates a continuing duty on the part of the State to disclose
inculpatory evidence Utah R. Crim. P. 16(b). The Kallin Court stated: "Whether
prosecutors produce inculpatory evidence under court order or on request, they have a
duty to comply fully and forthrightly."

State v. Kallin, 877 P.2d 138, 143 (Utah 1994)

(emphasis added). The Utah Supreme Court stated:
To meet basic standards of fairness and to insure that a trial is a real quest
for truth and not simply a contest between the parties to win, a defendant's
request for information which has been voluntarily complied with, or a
court order of discovery must be deemed to be a continuing request. And
even though there is no court-ordered disclosure, a prosecutor's failure to
disclose newly discovered inculpatory information which falls withfin] the
ambit of § 77-35-16(a), after the prosecution has made a voluntary disclosure
of evidence might so mislead defendant as to cause prejudicial error. State
v. Carter, 101 P.2d 656, 662 (Utah 1985); State v. Knight, 134 P.2d 913,
917, 53 Utah Adv. Rep, 13 (1987)
The Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provide a remedy when testimony which
19
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was not properly disclosed is sought to be admitted. Rule 16(g) states:
If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the
attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule, the
court may order such party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a
continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing evidence not disclosed,
or it may enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances.
In William's case, defense counsel made it's initial discovery request on July 7,
2008. (R. 54-56). In point 10 of the request, coimsel asked specifically for "[t]he name
of each and every witness who will be called to prove allegations against the defendant,
and a brief statement of the substance of what each witness will state at the time of trial."
(R. 55). The State was notified by the defense of the request nearly 9 months before trial.
At the time that Mendez was called to testify on the second day of trial, the defense had
received no information from the State regarding him. The State had not provided
Mendez' name, contact information, any synopsis about what his testimony would be, and
nothing regarding his very existence.
The State contended at trial, that because Mendez was called as a rebuttal witness
that no disclosure was necessary. (R. 1012: 80). In an exchange between the defense
counsel and the State:
Mr. Zabriskie: Any particular reason we're getting this now instead of before?
Ms. Stringham: I didn't know for sure if the defendant was going to testify until
this morning.
Mr. Zabriskie: But haven't you - this particular person in jail for the entire time
and weren't you aware of this back in the other trial?
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Ms. Stringham: I was aware of it. I keep mentioning that there are people that may
testify as to his prior drug usage and sales and frankly, / don yt want to disclose their
names until I absolutely have to. (Emphasis added).
Mr. Zabriskie: Well, we've asked for discovery, Your Honor, as to any and all
evidence that would be relevant in this case. And that's very, very relevant..,
(R. 1012: 89-80). From this exchange it is clear that the state new about the existence of
Mendez and what he would testify to, but did not want to disclose it to the defense.
As the State had received the discovery request months before and had voluntarily
responded to it, the State fell into a continuing duty to disclose all inculpatory evidence.
Mendez provided testimony that put $1,500.00 worth of Methamphetamine in William's
hands. (R. 1012: 86). Aside from transfer DNA on the bandana which contained the
drugs there was no other solid evidence that connected the drugs to William. There were
merely circumstantial connections which were first, the drugs were found in the borrowed
car; second, that the owner of the car stated she did not use drugs; and three, William was
the only occupant of the vehicle. (R. 1006: 314-16; 1006: 190-91). Mendez' testimony
that he observed William receive $1,500 worth of methamphetamine on consignment was
extremely inculpatory.
At trial, it was testified that the approximate value of the meth found in the car
William was operating was $1,500.00. (R. 1006: 372). This was profoundly damaging
testimony that was not disclosed to the defense until literally minutes before he was to
testify. (R. 1012: 78-82). The non-disclosure of this information placed the defense in a
predicament where the defendant was denied a fair trial because he did not have the
21
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benefit of preparing for this witness. The defense was precluded from sending its
investigator to talk to the witness and those associated with him.
While the State made allusions to someone being able to testify, no information on
specifically who it would be was provided. (R. 1012: 81). William maintained his
innocense on these charges and contended that he did not purchase any drugs. Based
upon William's assertion the defense would have no knowledge of who in the town of
Vernal or at the Vernal jail could possibly come in to testify.
The State failed to comply with the obligations that it undertook when it responded
to the defense request for discovery. The State absolutely knew long before the trial of the
existence of Mendez and had the intention of calling him as a witness. Despite the State's
knowledge, the State kept him a secret until the last possible moment.

William followed

the appropriate protocols of the Rule 16 and made his objection to the testimony of
Mendez at trial. That objection was over-ruled and Mendez was allowed to testify. The
court abused its discretion in allowing such inculpatory evidence to be presented when the
State failed to provide any information to the defense beforehand. Therefore, William
requests the court to overturn his conviction and grant a motion for a new trial. State v.
Perez, 2002 UT App 211 1j 24, 52 P.3d 4 5 1 .
CONCLUSION A N D PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
Willaim Dick requests that this Court reverse the trial courts decision to deny his
motion for a new trial and remand the case back to the Eighth District Court for a new
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trial.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 10th day of December, 2010.

Jp^J
Stephen R. Alfred
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I delivered two true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief
of Appellant to the Appeals Division, Utah Attorney General, 160 East 300 South, Sixth
Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, UT 84114, this 10th day of December, 2010.
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DISTRICT COURT
UINTAH COUNTY, UTAH

MAR 3 1 2010
BY

JOANfiElyiGKEE, CLERK
W ^
LAW CLERK

IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RULING AND ORDER ON
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A
NEW TRIAL

State of Utah,
Plaintiff,
vs.
William Alfred Diek,

Case No. 0S1S0QQ93

Defendant.

Judge A. LYNN PAYNE

This matter is before the Court on the Defendant's Motion for a New Trial. The
following issues have been raised by the Defendant to support the Motion:
1. The Defendant was not given advance notice that Miguel Mendez would testify as a
rebuttal witness.
2. The Defendant did not receive a copy of the Statement in Support of Guilty Plea which
Mr. Mendez had signed when he plead guilty to possession with intent to distribute on
March 25, 2008.
3. Mr. Mendez falsely testified the State had not given him consideration in exchange for
his testimony.
4. That even if the State did not in fact offer consideration for the testimony of Mr.
Mendez. the police officers offered Mr. Mendez consideration for his testimony during a
transcribed interview.
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5. That even if neither the State nor the police officers offered Mr, Mendez consideration
for his testimony, Mr. Mendez believed that he was obligated to testify in exchange for
the plea agreement.
6. That Mr. Mendez told Blake Horton prior to testifying:
a. The county attorney wanted him to testify.
b. If he testified the State had agreed:
1. Not to prosecute him on other charges, and
2. To deport him immediately after he testified.
c. That he would have to lie during his testimony but he was not concerned about
lying because no one could prove that he had lied and he would be back in
Mexico.
7. That if the State had identified Mr. Mendez as a rebuttal witness prior to trial, the
Defendant would have identified Mr. Horton as a witness and would have been able to
produce him at trial to impeach Mr. Mendez' rebuttal testimony.
8. That if the Defendant had been provided with a copy of the February 11, 2008 taped
interview of Mr. Mendez, he could have used the tape during cross examination of Mr.
Mendez to show that there was an agreement between the police officers and Mr. Mendez
which required him to testify, or that Mr. Mendez believed he would receive beneficial
treatment in exchange for his testimony.
9. The fact that the police officers asked the prosecutor not to file additional charges
against Mr. Mendez until after he was deported and the fact that Mr. Mendez was
deported three days after testifying indicate that Mr. Mendez received consideration for
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his rebuttal testimony.
For purposes of considering this Motion the Court has considered:
1. The time line surrounding these events:
a. Mr. Mendez was arrested January 21, 2008. He was charged with possession
of a controlled substance, a first degree felony, and possession of paraphernalia, a
class B misdemeanor.
b. Mr. Mendez remained in jail until March 30, 2008 (68 days). He was then
deported to Mexico.
c. The Defendant was arrested on February 11, 2008. That same day, Mr.
Mendez gave a recorded interview with the police. The following information
was provided during that interview:
1. A statement by Mr. Mendez that "I know pretty a lot of information
that could help you guys/* Def. \s Mot. New Trial, attachment C, p. 4,
(February 9, 2010).
2. A statement by law enforcement that they had charges against Mr.
Mendez which had not been filed. Id. at attachment C, p. 19.
3. A statement that the police officers knew Mr. Mendez dealt with the
Defendant. Id. at attachment C, p. 5.
4. A statement by law enforcement that the county attorney had asked the
officers to talk to Mr. Mendez to see if he would testify against the
Defendant. Id.
5. The police officers indicated they were asking Mr. Mendez to testify
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truthfully about drugs which Mr. Mendez dealt to the Defendant. Id.
6. The officers informed Mr. Mendez that he would be appointed an
attorney that morning and that the county attorney would get with his
attorney and "make sure whatever deal you guys are making is on the
level, you know, and you guys work that out. . . As far as to help you, and
if you're willing to help her . . . " Mr. Mendez replied "yeah, I will." Id.
at attachment C, p. 9-10.
7. The officers asked Mr. Mendez about the amount of drugs that were
coming into the area, Mexican cartels, collection methods when drugs
were not paid for, and about other individuals police believed were
involved in drugs in the area. Id. at attachment C, p. 10-16.
8. Mr. Mendez indicated "I'm ready to help . . . You know, testimony
against him." The officer responded "and I'm going to talk to her (the
prosecutor) about t h a t . . . Actually, I will go talk to her this morning, and
just let her know that we talked, and you would like to help. And then she
can - I'm not sure who your attorney will be this morning . . . but we'll
work on that because right now, you're in here on charges of dope that you
had at the house . . . " Id. at attachment C, p. 18.
9. The officers told Mr. Mendez they needed his help to put the Defendant
in jail. Mr. Mendez responded "I said I could help you (inaudible)." Id. at
attachment C, p. 19.
10. Later in the interview, Mr. Mendez said "but okay, so you talk to her
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(the prosecutor) and . . . " The officer responded "and, she'll talk to your
attorney this morning . . . and then they'll work something out." Id. at
attachment C, p. 21.
11. Later, Mr. Mendez indicated "but I will help. I will help." Id. at
attachment C, p. 22.
12. The police officers and Mr. Mendez discussed other individuals who
were involved in drugs in the area. Id. at attachment C, p. 24-25.
14. Mr. Mendez indicated that "but we can work it out. I want to help."
Id. at attachment C, p. 26.
d. Prior to testifying at trial, Mr. Mendez had two additional recorded interviews
with the police:
1. The vast majority of these interviews did not relate to the Defendant.
2. The two additional interviews are undated. It is apparent that the
interviews were conducted after the February 11, 2008 interview because
in the February 11th interview, Mr. Mendez had not been appointed an
attorney. By the time the two additional interviews had been recorded,
Mr. Mendez had an attorney and had spoken to his attorney.
3. In both interviews Mr. Mendez indicated a willingness to help police.
In Camera Review of Audio Tapes, p. 3 (December 9, 2009).
4. In tape three, Mr. Mendez indicated that he would have a hard time
testifying against the Defendant, and that he had told his attorney he would
not do that. Id.
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5. In tape four, a police officer indicated to Mr, Mendez that he (Mr.
Mendez) already knew what was on the table and that he (Mr. Mendez)
had already talked to his attorney and knew what "we" were willing to
offer. Later, a second officer indicated that he was not sure what deal had
been made. Mr. Mendez responded that it was six months and maybe get
off on probation. Id. at p. 4.
6. In tape four, a police officer indicated that he was not sure how long
Mr. Mendez would be in jail. Mr. Mendez indicated that the
recommendation would be for six months. The officer indicated that he
was not sure if he had to serve the whole time or receive credit for time
served and be released. Id.
7. In tape four, Mr. Mendez asked about a letter (subpoena) he had
received to testify at the Defendant's trial. Mr. Mendez asked if he would
be testifying against the Defendant. Id. at p. 4-5.
8. At the end of tape four, a police officer told Mr. Mendez that they
would tell the county attorney that Mr. Mendez had been very co-operative
and that she (the county attorney) would make her recommendations. Id.
at p. 5.
e. On March 25, 2008, Mr. Mendez entered into a written plea agreement with
the State wherein:
1. The State would reduce the first degree possession charge to a second
degree; dismiss the class B misdemeanor paraphernalia charge; would not
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file additional charges until after Mr. Mendez had been deported to
Mexico; and would recommend a sentence of six months in jail with a
release to ICE after March 30, 2009. Def 's Mot. New Trial, attachment f,
p. 7-8.
2. The Defendant agreed to plead guilty to the second degree felony. Id.
3. The plea agreement did not require Mr. Mendez to testify against the
Defendant. Id.
f. On the same day that Mr. Mendez plead guilty (March 25, 2009), Mr. Mendez
was sentenced to six months in jail with a provision that he could be released from
jail to ICE after March 30, 2009. Commitment Order, Case No. 091800040
(March 25, 2009).
g. ICE picked up Mr. Mendez for deportation on March 31, 2009, At that time,
Mr. Mendez had been in jail 68 days.
2. Additionally, the Court has considered the following:
a. A co-defendant of Mr. Mendez (Rito C. Carrasco, case # 091800041) was
originally charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to
distribute, a first degree felony. The State offered Mr. Carrasco the same plea
offer it offered Mr. Mendez except Mr. Carrasco would be required to forfeit a
large amount of money. Memo. Opp. Def. 's Mot. New Trial, Exh. E & F (June 24,
2009). Ultimately. Mr. Carrasco was allowed to plead to a third degree felony
(attempted distribution of a controlled substance). Id. at Exh. G. The agreement
also provided that additional charges would not be filed until Mr. Carrasco was
Page 7 of 22
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deported. Id. The Carrasco Alford plea agreement did not require Mr. Carrasco
to testify against the Defendant and he did not testify. Id. at Exh. D.
b. It is common for the county attorney to enter into plea agreements with illegal
aliens wherein the sentence recommendation would be from 30 to 60 days with a
release to ICE. Id. at Exh. C.
c. The Mendez Statement in Support of Guilty Plea and Certificate of Counsel
contains the following:
1. "All the promises, duties, and provisions of the plea agreement, if any,
are fully contained in the statement . . . " Def. 's Mot. New Trial,
attachment F, p. 7. The agreement did not contain any requirement that
Mr. Mendez testify against the Defendant.
2. The attorney for Mr. Mendez certified that the ". . . representations and
declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing affidavit, are true and
accurate." Id. at attachment F, p. 11. This would include the declaration
that the plea agreement was fully set forth in the statement in support of
guilty plea,
3. The prosecutor certified that ''the plea negotiations are fully contained
in the Statement and in the attached plea agreement or as supplemented on
the record before the court." Id. at attachment F, p. 12. There was no
contention that the plea agreement was supplemented at the time the plea
was entered.
g. The Defendant's trial was held on March 26-28 ; 2009.
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1. The day before the Defendant testified, the prosecutor had informed
defense counsel that if the Defendant testified, the State had two witnesses
over at the jail who would testify as to the Defendant's drug use. Id, at
attachment A, p. 6.
2. During the State's case, the State introduced evidence that:
i. The Defendant had borrowed a car from a friend on February 10,
2008.
ii. That there were no drugs in the car when the Defendant took
possession of the car. The police officers found a bandana
containing drugs which was not in the car when the Defendant
picked up the car.
iii. The car did not have clothes scattered throughout it when the
Defendant received it.
iv. The Defendant was located in the parking lot of the Uintah
Basin Care Center the next morning still in possession of the
vehicle. (There is a hospital in Vernal that provides emergency
care for injured people. The care center is for long term care,
primarily for senior citizens. The care center is located several
blocks away from the hospital).
v. When the Defendant was first observed in the parking lot of the
Uintah Basin Care Center, he was asleep or passed out and had no
clothing on from the waist down.
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VL The Defendant did not immediately respond when police
officers knocked on the window to awaken him. When he did
respond he was disoriented and had difficulty standing,
vii. The police officers found drugs within the vehicle, including
drugs contained in a bandana. The Defendant's DNA was located
on the bandana.
viii. There were a lot of clothes scattered about the vehicle.
The Defendant testified at trial:
1. He testified that he did not know the drugs were in the vehicle. {The
implication was that they were in the car when he received the vehicle and
that the owner's husband had a history of drug use).
2. He testified that he did not know how his DNA got on the bandana
other than that he may have touched the bandana inadvertently.
3. He explained his condition when found by police through testimony
that he had become stuck in the snow on a rural road and that he had spent
hours clearing a path for his vehicle to get through the snow. He testified
that he was outside his vehicle for long periods of time without adequate
winter clothing. He testified that his feet were severely frost bitten as a
result of exposure to the elements. He indicated that instead of going to a
nearby hospital, he had gone to the care center to seek assistance from a
friend who was a patient at the care center. He testified that he passed out
or went to sleep after parking his vehicle in the parking lot of the care
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center. The Defendant testified that his feet had been severely frost bitten
and that he was still suffering from the affects of the frost bite more than a
year later. He also testified that he had not been using drugs during that
period of time,
h. The State called the following rebuttal witnesses:
1. A jailer who testified that the Defendant had not requested medical
attention when he was brought to jail after his arrest on February 11, 2008.
2. The jailer also testified that when he was booked into the jail, the
Defendant filled out a form wherein he stated that he had used cocaine
within the previous month and had used marijuana the day before the
arrest.
3. Mr. Mendez testified that he had been present when the Defendant
purchased methamphetamine.
4. Mr. Mendez testified that he had plead guilty to possession with intent
to distribute on March 25, 2009 (two days before he testified). He testified
that he had received a six-month jail sentence, and that he had not been
offered any consideration for his testimony against the Defendant.
I. During cross examination of Mr. Mendez, counsel for the Defendant asked Mr.
Mendez about his written plea agreement (the statement of Defendant in support
of guilty plea). The plea agreement was in Mendez' file in the file room at the
courthouse and the Court told Defense counsel that the Court would arrange for
the file to be brought to the courtroom so that it would be available to Defense
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counsel while Mr. Mendez was being cross examined. Defense counsel indicated
that it would not be necessary to have the file brought to the courtroom. Defense
counsel cross examined Mr. Mendez concerning:
1. His testimony that he was net testifying as a result of the plea
agreement
2. The reduction of the crime from a first degree felony, which carried a
possible sentence of from five years to life, to a second degree felony
which was punishable by imprisonment of from one to fifteen years.
3. The fact that Mr. Mendez had received a sentence of six months as
punishment for a crime which could be punished by imprisonment from 1
to 15 years.
4. Mr. Mendez* testimony concerning the Defendant purchasing
methamphetamine, and how Mr. Mendez could remember the event one
year later.
5. The fact that Mr. Mendez was a confessed drug dealer and had
facilitated the sale of drugs by third parties.
6. The fact that Mr. Mendez would be deported soon after he testified.
j . On October 28, 2009, the Court held an evidentiary hearing on the Motion for a
New Trial. The Court required the State's attorney (Mrs. Stringham) and defense
attorney (Lance Dean) in the Mendez' case to be present so they could be
examined by defense counsel concerning the affidavits that they had filed with the
Court. Defense counsel did not cross examine either attorney.
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1. At the hearing, Mr. Horton testified about the letter he had written after
the Defendant was sentenced (May 27, 2009). He testified that Mr.
Mendez told him the county attorney had asked him to testify. Mr. Horton
testified that Mr. Mendez told him that if he (Mr. Mendez) testified he had
to lie. Mr. Horton testified that Mr. Mendez told him that if he (Mr.
Mendez) testified additional charges would not be filed and he would be
deported to Mexico. Mr. Horton testified that Mr. Mendez told him he
was not worried about possible consequences from testifying falsely
because no one could prove that his testimony was false and he would be
in Mexico.
2. Within a day or two before Mr. Horton testified (October 28, 2009),
Mr. Horton had been contacted by Detective Murray. Mr. Horton told
Detective Murray in a recorded interview that he had no recollection of
any conversation with Mr. Mendez concerning Mr. Mendez' testimony.
3. Mr. Horton stated that he and the Defendant were good friends.
The attorneys in the Mendez case have filed affidavits with the Court:
1. Mr. Mendez' attorney, Lance Dean, affirmed under oath that the
Mendez plea agreement did not include an agreement to testify against the
Defendant. Mr. Dean stated that he told Mr. Mendez that he did not have
to testily and the sentencing recommendations would be the same whether
or not Mendez testified,
2. Mrs. Stringham (the prosecutor) affirmed that none of the terms of the
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agreement with Mr. Mendez required him to testify in this case. She
stated that the agreement with Mr. Mendez was similar to many
agreements with illegal aliens. She stated that cases against illegal aliens
were typically disposed of before deportation. She stated that instead of
dismissing the additional charges against Mr. Mendez at the time of the
plea, she decided to file the additional charges after deportation in order to
provide an additional incentive for Mr. Mendez and his co-defendant not
to come back to the United States.
3. The Court received no evidence which would contradict the affidavits
of these attorneys.
Analysis
Rule 24(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure states:
The court may, upon motion of a party or upon its owrn initiative, grant a new trial in
the interest of justice if there is any error or impropriety which had a substantial
adverse effect upon the rights of a party.
The Defendant argues the prosecution improperly withheld evidence constituting a Brady
violation. The Defendant argues the violation deprived him of due process and entitles him to a
new trial.
In Brady v. Maryland, the Court held "suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable
to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
The Court will individually address each of the issues raised by the Defendant.
1. Was the State obligated to give the Defendant advance notice that Mr. Mendez would
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testify as a rebuttal witness?
Previously, the Court ruled that the State was not obligated to disclose the identity of this
rebuttal witness. Although the Court has ruled on this issue, the Court will supplement its prior
ruling here.
At trial there were two rebuttal witnesses which were called by the State: the jailer and
Mr. Mendez. The Defendant alleges he was denied due process when Mr. Mendez testified.
Interestingly, the Defendant does not object to the jailer's testimony which was similar and
probably more adverse to the Defendant than the testimony of Mr. Mendez (i.e., while Mr.
Mendez testified that he observed the Defendant purchase drugs, the jailer testified that the
Defendant directly admitted to recent drug use). Additionally, the prosecutor informed defense
counsel the day before the Defendant testified that the State had witnesses who would testify as
to the Defendant's drug use. Therefore, prior to the time the Defendant chose to testify, the
defense was aware that the State had witnesses who would testify concerning the Defendant's
drug use. Therefore, the Defense was aware of the nature of the rebuttal testimony before Mr.
VIcnde/took the stand.
Furthermore, the State cannot anticipate whether a defendant will testify at trial or what
the content of the testimony will be. When the Defendant testified as to what caused his
condition at the time of the arrest (which condition was consistent with drug use) and testified
that he was not using drugs at the time of his arrest, the State was entitled to present evidence
that the Defendant had not been tmthful in his testimony. The State should not be placed in the
position of anticipating that the Defendant would testify contrary to his statement to the jailer or
that he would testify that he did not use drugs.
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Given the above, the Court finds that the State was not obligated to provide the identity of
rebuttal witnesses prior to trial.
2. Did the State violate the Defendant's due process rights by not providing the
Defendant a copy of Mr. Mendez' statement in support of guilty plea?
The Court has also ruled on this issue. During trial, the Court offered to make this
document available to counsel for Defendant to assist in his cross examination of Mr. Mendez.
Counsel for Defendant declined the Court's offer and the document was not produced. The
Defendant cannot now claim that his rights were violated when he was given an opportunity to
review the plea agreement at trial but declined to do so.
At trial, Mr. Mendez was cross examined fairly extensively concerning his plea
agreement. Counsel for Defendant cross examined Mr. Mendez as to whether he had agreed to
testify as part of his plea agreement. Counsel for Defendant asked him about the reduction from
a first to a second degree felony, the sentence of six months on a crime that originally carried a
possible sentence of five years to life, his recollection as to the events that he had testified to,
how the passage of time may have affected his memory, and the fact that he would be deported
soon after he testified. Indeed, all of the information in the written plea agreement was disclosed
during the testimony of Mr. Mendez. Nothing in the written plea agreement was inconsistent
with the testimony of Mr. Mendez. Therefore, the Defendant's due process rights were not
violated by not having the written plea agreement at trial.
3. Did Mr. Mendez testify falsely when he testified that his plea agreement did not
require him to testify?
The issue here is not whether Mr. Mendez had agreed to co-operate with the police. He
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Therefore, it was certainly not a violation of the Defendant's due process rights for the State to
fail to provide his identity as a potential witness. Similarly, the State was unaware of the content
of Mr. Horton's testimony. Consequently, the State could not provide this information to the
Defendant prior to trial (the information provided by Mr. Horton is more properly characterized
as newly discovered evidence, which is not a theory relied upon by the Defendant).
4. Even if the State did not enter into an agreement requiring Mr. Mendez to testify, did
the police officers enter into an agreement with Mr. Mendez which required him to testify?
The Defendant relies entirely on the February 11, 2009, taped interview to support his
theory that the police officers entered into a separate or additional agreement which required Mr.
Mendez to testify in this case. Mr. Mendez testified that there was no agreement which required
him to testify. No police officer testified to such an agreement. The taped interviews clearly
demonstrate that the State wanted Mr. Mendez to testify. Mr. Mendez' statements in the taped
interviews (with the exception of one statement that he would not testify because he was afraid of
the Defendant) indicate a willingness to testify. However, there is nothing in the tapes which
would indicate that the police and the Defendant entered into any plea agreement or that they
agreed he would receive consideration for testifying against the Defendant. Whenever the
subject of the actual agreement was discussed, it was always in anticipation that the attorneys
would negotiate the agreement. The police always indicated that the attorneys would be
responsible for working out any potential deal. The tapes do not support the existence of a
separate or additional agreement between the police and Mr. Mendez that would require Mr.
Mendez to testify.
Finally, the very fact that the parties later negotiated and entered into a written agreement
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which did not require Mr. Mendez to testify mitigates against the idea that there was a separate
verbal agreement to testify.
5. Even if there was no agreement between the State and Mr. Mendez, or the police and
Mr. Mendez, did Mr. Mendez believe that he was obligated to testify?
The Defendant also implies that Mr. Mendez may have believed that he was required to
testify even though there was no actual agreement to testify. However, Mr. Mendez' attorney
told him that the sentence recommendation would not be changed whether he chose to testify or
not. Also, Mr. Mendez testified that there was no agreement to testify. Importantly, Mr.
Mendez" plea agreement was made prior to his testimony. Indeed, before Mr. Mendez was even
called to testify, the agreement had been fully performed. The agreement was of record and Mr.
Mendez had been sentenced before he testified. At the time of Mr. Mendez' testimony, he had
no incentive to testify based on a plea agreement that was already completely performed. Finally,
even if Mr. Mendez mistakenly thought he was obligated to testify, there is no evidence that the
State was aware of Mr. Mendez' mistaken belief. It would clearly not be a due process violation
for the State to fail to disclose information that they did not have.
6. Would the Defendant have identified Mr. Horton as a witness to rebut the testimony of
Mr. Mendez if the State had identified Mr. Mendez as a rebuttal witness?
Mr. Horton testified he had a conversation with Mr. Mendez prior to Mendez' testimony
on March 27, 2009. Mr. Horton testified he did not disclose this conversation to anyone until
alter the Defendant was sentenced on May 27, 2009. Apparently no one, -including the State,
knew oi the alleged conversation prior to the publication of the letter Mr. Horton wrrote after the
Defendant's trial. The Defendant offers no explanation as to how the disclosure of Mr. Mendez
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as a witness would have led to Mr. Horton. It is mere supposition to assume that the disclosure
of Mr. Mendez as a witness would have lead to the discovery of Mr. Horton as a rebuttal witness
to the testimony of Mr. Mendez. The Defendant has failed to show that it was reasonably likely
that Mr. Horton would have been identified as a witness had the State identified Mr. Mendez as a
rebuttal witness.
7. If the State had provided the Defendant with the transcribed tapes, could the
Defendant have used the tapes during cross examination of Mr. Mendez to establish an
agreement which required Mr. Mendez to testify?
The Court has discussed this issue in paragraphs three and four above. As indicated,
while there is evidence which suggests the State wanted Mr. Mendez to testify, and there is
evidence that suggests Mr. Mendez was willing to testify, the tapes do not indicate that any
agreement was agreed to during the interviews. Indeed, a fair interpretation of the tapes is that
the parties to the interviews each anticipated that the agreement would be negotiated between the
attorneys after the interviews. In view of the unchallenged affidavit of the attorneys who
negotiated the agreement that the agreement did not require Mr. Mendez to testify and given all
the evidence at trial (which included the testimony of the jailer that the Defendant admitted to
recent drug use, the presence of the Defendants DNA on the bandana which contained the drugs)
any failure to produce the tapes does not rise to a reasonable possibility that, had the tapes been
disclosed, the result of the trial would have been different.
8. Does the fact that the State agreed not to bring additional charges until after Mr.
Mendez was deported, and the fact that Mr. Mendez was released to ICE three days after
testifying, show there was an agreement to testify?
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Clearly, the Mendez agreement for a sentence of 68 days was common under similar
circumstances. See Memo. Opp. Mot. New Trial, Exh. C. Also, it was common to have a jail
sentence terminate when ICE picked up a defendant who was in the country unlawfully. Id.
Moreover, all of this was approved and adopted in the sentence imposed by Judge Anderson who
was not informed of any agreement to testify. Additionally, the agreement with Mr. Mendez was
arguably less favorable than the deal offered to his co-defendant, Mr. Carrasco, who was not
asked to testify at the Defendant's trial. Finally, the agreement not to file additional charges
against Mr. Mendez until after he was deported is arguably less favorable to Mr. Mendez because
the charges were not dismissed and could be the basis for punishment if Mr. Mendez comes back
to the U.S.
Therefore, the circumstances surrounding Mr. Mendez' deportation and the particulars of
his plea agreement do not suggest that he was obligated to testify as a condition of his plea
agreement.
Overall, the Defendant has failed to show that a Brady violation occurred. Given the
facts in the ease, the evidence was not material to the outcome of the trial. There is no credible
evidence that Mr. Mendez testified falsely. There is no credible evidence the State made an
agreement which required Mr. Mendez to testify. There is no evidence the police made a
separate agreement which required Mr. Mendez to testify. There is no evidence that Mr. Mendez
believed he was required to testify as a condition of his plea agreement.
Consequently, the Defendant's Motion for a New Trial is denied.
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Dated this

J

day of

W*KJL.

2010.

BY THE COURT:

sts

A. LYNN PAYNE, District Court Judge
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